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Abstract- Due to the spectrum reuse in small cell network, the inter-cell interference has great effection on MEC’s 
performance. In this paper, for reducing the energy consumption and latency of MEC, we propose a game theory 
based jointing offloading decision and resource allocation algorithm for multi-user MEC. In this algorithm, the 
transmission power, offloading decision, and mobile user’s CPU capability are determined jointly. We prove that 
this game is an exact potential game and the NE of this game exists and is unique. For reaching the NE, the best 
response dynamic is applied. We calculate the best responses of these three variables. Moreover, we investigate the 
properties of this algorithm, including the convergence, the computation complexity, and the price of anarchy. The 
theoretical analysis shows that the inter-cell interference has great effection on the performance of MEC. The NE of 
this game is Pareto efficiency and also the global optimal solution of the proposed optimal issue. Finally, we 
evaluate the performance of this algorithm by simulation. The simulation results illustrates that this algorithm is 
effective on improving the performance of the multi-user MEC system. 
Index Terms-Mobile edge computing, offloading decision, transmission power control, game theory, interference. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
With the development of smart mobile devices, more and more applications, which are 
computation-intensive, resource-hungry, and high energy consumption, emerge and attract great 
attention [1][2][3][4]. However, due to the computation capability and the energy of the mobile 
devices are always limited, the quality of computation experience cannot be satisfied. For 
releasing the tension between the resource limitation of the mobile devices and the requirements 
of the computation-intensive applications, the mobile edge computing (MEC) is proposed. Based 
on MEC, the requirements of low latency and energy-saving are satisfied by offloading the 
                                                 
Ning Li, Jose-Fernan Martinez-Ortega, and Gregorio Rubio are with the Universidad Politenica de Madrid, Madrid, 
Spain. 
E-mail: {li.ning, jf.martinez, gregorio.rubio}@upm.es. 
computation tasks to the resource-rich clouds that deployed by telecom operators [5]. The MEC 
can provide pervasive and agile computation augmenting services for mobile users at anytime 
and anywhere. 
A. Related works and Motivation 
The main purpose of MEC is to reduce energy consumption and latency by carefully designing 
the task offloading scheme and resource allocation manner [1][2][3][4], which has been learned 
separately or jointly in both the single-user and multi-user MEC system [6]-[18]. The resource 
allocation includes the channel allocation, CPU capability control, transmission power control, 
etc. In [6], the author proposes a game theory approach which can achieve efficient computation 
offloading for mobile cloud computing; the authors in [5] apply the conclusions in [6] into the 
multi-user MEC system and propose a game theory based offloading decision algorithm; in this 
algorithm, the mobile users decide whether offload the tasks to MEC servers and which 
communication channels are used in a distributed manner. In [7], the authors propose an optimal 
offloading policy for the applications which include sequential component dependency graphs 
and multi-radio enabled mobile devices. This policy can minimize the energy consumption of the 
mobile devices since the execution time is below a given threshold and the percentage of 
transmitted data is determined simultaneously. Different with the algorithm shown in [7], the 
authors in [8] solve the task offloading issues for arbitrary dependency graphics; in this 
algorithm, the wireless-aware scheduling of the application components and the offloading 
strategy are taken into account jointly. In [9], the authors propose an effective computation 
model for MEC system, which joints the computation and communication cooperation together 
to improve the system performance. The task offloading decision and the computational 
frequency scaling are learned jointly in [10]; in this paper, the latency and energy consumption 
are minimized by jointly optimizing the task allocation decision and CPU frequency of the 
mobile user. In [11], the computational speed and transmission power of mobile device and the 
offloading ratio are optimized jointly for reducing energy consumption and latency via dynamic 
voltage scaling technology. In [12], the transmission power control and offloading decision in 
MEC system under single-user scenario is investigated. As an improvement, the authors in [13] 
and [14] expand the conclusions in [12] to the multi-user MEC system and combine with the 
resource allocation to improve the performance of multi-user MEC system by Lyapunov 
optimization. Similar to [13], the authors in [15] proposed a centralized algorithm for multi-
server multi-user MEC system, which joints the task offloading and resource allocation together; 
the jointing optimal issue is formulated as a mixed integer non-liner program problem in this 
algorithm. The service delay in MEC is reduced in [16] through virtual machine migration and 
transmission power control; the users transmit data to cloudlet in a round robin fashion and the 
service delay is reduced by controlling cloudlets’ transmission power. In [17], an integrated 
framework for computation offloading and interference management in MEC system is proposed, 
in which, the offloading decision, physical resource block allocation, and MEC computation 
resource allocation are taken into account to improve the performance of MEC.  
However, there are some limitations in the commonly adopted assumptions of the algorithms 
introduced above. Due to the spectrum reuse in small cell network, the inter-cell interference is 
critical to the quality of service [18][19][20]. If too many mobile users choose the same wireless 
channel to offload the computation task simultaneously, they may cause severe interference to 
each other, which would reduce the data rate and increase the energy consumption. This hence 
can lead to low energy efficiency and long latency. In [5]-[11], the inter-cell interference is not 
taken into account when determine the offloading decision of the mobile user. It has been shown 
that efficient power control can mitigate inter-cell interference successfully in small cell network 
[18][19][20][21], so some transmission power control based algorithms are proposed for MEC, 
such as [12]-[16]. Nevertheless, the [12] is proposed for single-user MEC system; the 
transmission power control algorithm proposed in [16] is mainly for the cloudlets rather than the 
mobile users; the algorithms proposed in [13], [14], and [15] are effective in multi-user MEC 
system, but they are centralized which are not always efficient in the distributed system, such as 
the wireless sensor network and the IoT applications. The distributed power control schemes 
outperform the centralized counterparts due to less information exchange and computations [22]. 
B. Main Contributions 
Based on the issues aforementioned, we propose a game theory based algorithm for MEC, which 
joints the transmission power control, the offloading decision, and the CPU capability of mobile 
user together to improve the performance of MEC. The contributions of this paper are: 
1. we joints the transmission power control, the offloading decision, and the CPU frequency 
control of the mobile user for the multi-user MEC system in a distributed manner; in this 
algorithm, the game theory, which is a powerful approach on solving the distributed issues in 
wireless network [2][23], is applied; 
2. For reaching the Nash Equilibrium (NE) of this game, we introduce the best response 
dynamic into the iteration process; since there are three variables in the optimal function and 
they are relevant, we investigate the relationship between these variables and how to calculate 
the best responses of these variables; we also prove that the main factor affects the 
performance of MEC is the inter-cell interference;  
3. We investigated the properties of this game; first, we prove that the game introduced in this 
paper is an exact potential game; second, we prove that the NE of this game exists and is 
unique; third, we proved that this game is convergence and reaching the NE of this game is 
Polynomial Local Search (PLS) complete based on the best response dynamic;  
4. We investigate the properties of the proposed algorithm in detail; first, we analyze the 
computation complexity of this algorithm and prove that the algorithm can be finished in 
polynomial time; second, we investigate the price of anarchic (PoA) of this game in terms of 
the network computation overhead; to the PoA, we conclude that reducing the inter-cell 
interference can improve the performance of MEC effectively; finally, we prove that the NE 
of this game is Pareto efficiency and also a global optimal solution of the issues shown in (11). 
II. NETWORK MODEL AND PROBLEM STATEMENT 
There are N mobile users in the network, denoted as 𝑵 = {1, 2, … , 𝑁}. The mobile users are 
divided into L small cells and each small cell is served by a base station (BS), denoted as 
𝑳 = {1, 2, … , 𝐿}. The mobile user n which is in small cell l is expressed as 𝑛𝑙. Each user can only 
connect to one BS that is selected based on long-term channel quality measurement [20]. In this 
paper, the OFDMA is used for the upper link communication of the task offloading from the 
mobile user to MEC server [18][19][20]; the universal frequency reuse deployment in which 
every cell shares the whole bandwidth is applied [18][19][20]. In OFDMA, the available 
spectrum is divided into K subchannels and the index of these subchannels is 𝑲 = {1, 2, … , 𝐾}. 
In the MEC system, each mobile user has a computation intensive task, which can be calculated 
locally or offloaded to the MEC server through BS that deployed proximity to the user. There are 
two offloading models for mobile user [1]: binary offloading and partial offloading. In this paper, 
for unifying these two schemas, we introduce the offloading ratio into the offloading decision as 
that used in [9] and [11].  
Definition 1. The offloading ratio 𝜆 ∈ [0, 1] is defined as the ratio of the computation tasks that 
offloaded to MEC server; when 𝜆 = 0 or 𝜆 = 1, it is binary offloading; when 𝜆 ∈ (0, 1), it is 
partial offloading.  
Based on Definition 1, the ratio of the computation task that executed locally is 1 − . The 
transmission power of the mobile user can be adjusted from 𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛 to 𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑥. In wireless network, 
the minimum transmission power 𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛 should make the SINR larger than the threshold [18] (the 
SINR threshold relates to the hardware architecture of users). Note that when 𝜆 = 0 , the 
computation task will be executed locally, which means 𝑝 = 0; when 𝜆 ≠ 0, the task needs to be 
offloaded to the MEC server and 𝑝 ≠ 0; so the feasible region of the transmission power, which 
takes the task offloading decision into account, is 𝑝 ∈ {0, [𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛,  𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑥]}. As introduced in [18], 
[19], and [20], since the BS has more global information about the small cell than the mobile 
users, so the BS selects a spectrum band and schedules the users in its cell to different 
subchannels which are orthogonal. Therefore, the offloading ratio is decided by the mobile user 
and the communication channels of the mobile users will be allocated by the BSs in this paper.  
A. Communication Model 
In OFDMA, the mobile users in the same small cell cannot affect each other due to the 
orthogonality of the communication channels; only the mobile users in different small cells and 
use the same subchannel can affect each other. So we define the interference users set of user n 
in channel k as: the set of mobile users which in different small cells with user n and use channel 
k to transmit data to the MEC server, denoted as 𝐼𝑛
𝑘. Therefore, the interference of user n when 
offloading the task to MEC server through channel k is: Γ𝑛
𝑘 = ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑖∈𝐼𝑛𝑘, 𝑖>0 𝐺𝑖 . Based on the 
Shannon-Hartley formula [24], the transmission rate of mobile user n can be calculated as:   
 𝑟𝑛
𝑘(, 𝒑) = 𝑘 log2(1 + 𝑝𝑛𝐺𝑛 (𝑁0 + Γ𝑛
𝑘)⁄ )     (1) 
where 𝑘 is the wireless channel bandwidth; N0 is the power of Gaussian white noise; Gn is the 
channel gain between mobile user n and BS;  is the set of offloading decisions of the mobile 
users and  = {1, 2, … , 𝑁} ; 𝒑  is the set of transmission powers of the mobile users and 
𝒑 = {𝑝1, 𝑝2, … , 𝑝𝑁}. From (1), we can find that the transmission rate of mobile user n not only 
relates to its transmission power and offloading decision but also the interference users’. The 
transmission rate of user n is affected by the interference users, and user n also affects the 
transmission rate of the interference users. Due to the interaction between user n and its 
interference users, the power control and the offloading decision are coupled.  
B. Interference Graph 
In order to quantify the inter-cell interference, we employ the interference graph defined in [18], 
[19], and [20]. In OFDMA, if user 𝑖 ∈ 𝐼𝑛
𝑘 can affect the data transmission of user n, then 𝑅𝑖 ≥ |𝑖𝑛|, 
where 𝑅𝑖 is the transmission range of user i and |𝑖𝑛| is the distance between user i and user n. 
Based on this conclusion, two kinds of neighbor sets of user n can be defined: (1) the users in 𝐼𝑛
𝑘 
and can affect the data transmission of user n are defined as 𝐼𝑛
𝑘,𝑖𝑛
, denoted as 𝐼𝑛
𝑘,𝑖𝑛 ≜ {𝑖 ∈ 𝐼𝑛
𝑘 , 𝑅𝑖 ≥
|𝑖𝑛|}; obviously, 𝐼𝑛
𝑘,𝑖𝑛 ∈ 𝐼𝑛
𝑘; (2) the users in 𝐼𝑛
𝑘 and can be affected by the transmission of user n 
are defined as 𝐼𝑛
𝑘,𝑜𝑢𝑡
, denoted as 𝐼𝑛
𝑘,𝑜𝑢𝑡 ≜ {𝑖 ∈ 𝐼𝑛
𝑘, 𝑅𝑛 ≥ |𝑖𝑛|}; moreover, 𝐼𝑛
𝑘,𝑜𝑢𝑡 ∈ 𝐼𝑛
𝑘. Note that the 
𝐼𝑛
𝑘,𝑖𝑛
 may not equal to the 𝐼𝑛
𝑘,𝑜𝑢𝑡
, since the transmission powers of the mobile users are different. 
User i can affect user n does not mean that node n can also affect user i. So the interference Γ𝑛
𝑘 
can be rewritten as: Γ𝑛
𝑘 = ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑖∈𝐼𝑛
𝑘,𝑖𝑛, 𝑖>0
𝐺𝑖. 
B. Computation Model 
For mobile user n, there is a computation task 𝑇𝑛 = {𝐿𝑛, 𝐶𝑛} which can be calculated locally or 
offloaded to the MEC server through BS. The Ln is the length of the input data (bits) and Cn is 
the computation workload (CPU cycles needed for one-bit data).  
B.1 Computation Model of Local Execution  
When 𝜆𝑛 = 0, the computation task Tn is executed locally, then 𝑝𝑛 = 0 and 𝑟𝑛(𝝀, 𝒑) = 0; thus, 
the latency for calculating this task can be shown as:  
 𝑡𝑛
𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 = 𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛 𝑓𝑛⁄     (2) 
where 𝑓𝑛 is the CPU cycles per second (i.e. the computation capability) of user n with the upper 
bound is 𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑥. Different mobile users have different computation capabilities and each mobile 
user can adjust its computation capability from 0 to 𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑥 . Based on [5] and [13], the energy 
consumption for calculating the computation task Tn is:  
 𝑒𝑛
𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 = 𝜅𝑛𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛𝑓𝑛
2   (3) 
In (3), 𝜅𝑛 is a constant related to the hardware architecture of mobile device n. The dynamic 
power consumption is proportional to 𝑉𝑐
2𝑓𝑛, where Vc is the circuit supply voltage. When the 
operating voltage is low, the CPU frequency is approximately linear proportional to the voltage 
supply [13][25][26]. Thus, the energy consumption of one CPU cycle is 𝜅𝑛𝑓𝑛
2. According to (2) 
and (3), based on the overhead defined in [5], the overhead of computing locally is: 
 𝑂𝑛
𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 = 𝛼𝑡,𝑛(𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛 𝑓𝑛⁄ ) + 𝛼𝑒,𝑛𝜅𝑛𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛𝑓𝑛
2   (4) 
where 𝛼𝑡,𝑛, 𝛼𝑒,𝑛 ∈ [0,1] denote the weights of computational latency and energy for user n's 
decision making, respectively. When user n cares about energy consumption, the user n can set 
𝛼𝑡,𝑛 = 0 and 𝛼𝑒,𝑛 = 1; otherwise, when user n is sensitive to delay, then user n can set 𝛼𝑡,𝑛 = 1 
and 𝛼𝑒,𝑛 = 0. This model can take both computational latency and energy consumption into the 
decision making at the same time. In practice, the proper weights can be determined by the 
multi-attribute utility approach in multiple criteria decision making theory [27]. 
B.2 Computation Model of Cloud computing 
When 𝜆𝑛 > 0, part of or all of the computation tasks are offloaded to the MEC server, where 
𝑝𝑛 ∈ [𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛, 𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑥] and 𝑟𝑛(𝝀, 𝒑) > 0. Assuming that the communication channel assigned to mobile 
user n is k, the latency for transmitting the input data to MEC server can be calculated as:  
 𝑡𝑛,𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠
𝑘 = 𝐿𝑛 𝑟𝑛
𝑘(𝝀, 𝒑)⁄         (5) 
If the transmission power of mobile user n for transmitting the computation task to MEC server 
through channel k is 𝑝𝑛
𝑘, the energy consumption of the data transmission is:  
  𝑒𝑛,𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠
𝑘 = 𝑝𝑛
𝑘𝑡𝑛,𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑑
𝑘 = 𝑝𝑛
𝑘𝐿𝑛 𝑟𝑛
𝑘(𝝀, 𝒑)⁄    (6) 
When the input data is offloaded to the MEC server, the MEC server calculates the computation 
task based on the input data. According to (2), the latency of task execution in MEC server is: 
  𝑡𝑛
𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑑 = 𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛 𝑓𝑐⁄     (7) 
where 𝑓𝑐 is the CPU cycles per second of MEC server. Similar to (3), the energy consumption in 
MEC server is:  
  𝑒𝑛
𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑑 = 𝜅𝑐𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛𝑓𝑐
2   (8) 
where c is a constant related to the hardware architecture of the MEC server. 
Therefore, based on (5), (6), (7), and (8), the overhead of cloud computing can be calculated as: 
 𝑂𝑛
𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑑 = 𝛼𝑡,𝑛(𝑡𝑛,𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠
𝑘 + 𝑡𝑛
𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑑) + 𝛼𝑒,𝑛(𝑒𝑛,𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠
𝑘 + 𝑒𝑛
𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑑) (9) 
According to the offloading decision ratio n, the length of the input data that calculated locally 
is (1 − 𝜆𝑛)𝐿𝑛 and the length of the input data that offloaded to the MEC server is 𝜆𝑛𝐿𝑛 [9][11]. 
Thus, the whole computation overhead of user n, which takes the overheads of local computing 
and cloud computing into account, can be calculated as:  
𝑂𝑛 = 𝛼𝑡,𝑛 (
𝜆𝑛𝐿𝑛
𝑟𝑛
𝑘(𝝀,𝒑)
+
𝜆𝑛𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛
𝑓𝑐
+
(1−𝜆𝑛)𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛
𝑓𝑛
) + 𝛼𝑒,𝑛 (
𝜆𝑛𝑝𝑛
𝑘𝐿𝑛
𝑟𝑛
𝑘(𝝀,𝒑)
 + 𝜆𝑛𝜅𝑐𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛𝑓𝑐
2 + (1 − 𝜆𝑛)𝜅𝑛𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛𝑓𝑛
2)      (10) 
C. Problem Statement 
For the distributed manner of the offloading decision and resource allocation in MEC system, 
each mobile user makes the offloading decision and allocates the wireless resource based on the 
local information to minimize the computation overhead. In this paper, the transmission power, 
the offloading decision, and the CPU capabilities of mobile users are the control variables; 
therefore, the problem needs to be solved in this paper is shown in P1: 
                                            𝐏𝟏: min ∑ 𝑂𝑛(𝜆𝑛, 𝑝𝑛, 𝑓𝑛)𝑛∈𝑵  
                                                  𝑠. 𝑡.   0 ≤ 𝜆𝑛 ≤ 1, 𝑛 ∈ 𝑵                                (a) 
                                                           𝑝𝑛 ∈ {
[𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛, 𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑥], 𝜆𝑛 > 0, 𝑛 ∈ 𝑵
{0},                  𝜆𝑛 = 0, 𝑛 ∈ 𝑵
      (b)         (11) 
                                                           0 ≤ 𝑓𝑛 ≤ 𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑥, 𝑛 ∈ 𝑵                         (c) 
The main issue needed to be solved is that how the mobile users choose the values of these 
variables in a decentralized manner to make the network overhead shown in (11) minimize. 
According to the conclusion in [5] and [15], the offloading decision and transmission power 
control between different users to make the network overhead minimum is a NP-hard problem; 
so it can be found easily that P1 is also a NP-hard problem. These three variables are related and 
coupled. The 𝑓𝑛  and 𝑝𝑛  relate to 𝜆𝑛: if 𝜆𝑛 = 0, then 𝑓𝑛 ≠ 0 and 𝑝𝑛 = 0; otherwise, 𝑓𝑛 = 0 and 
𝑝𝑛 ∈ [𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛, 𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑥]. The 𝜆𝑛 determines by the values of  𝑂𝑛
𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑑 and 𝑂𝑛
𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 which also relates to 
𝑓𝑛 and 𝑝𝑛. Moreover, the offloading decision and transmission power between different mobile 
users are also relevant, which can be found in (1). The centralized manners of determining the 
offloading decision and the transmission power has been introduced in [13], [14], and [15]. 
However, for the point of view of the mobile user, the centralized manner is not always effective 
in practice; moreover, it is not feasible for the mobile users to get the global information of the 
network. Thus, we introduce the game theory into the network overhead minimization. 
III. MULTI-USER OFFLOADING DECISION AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION GAME 
According to the P1 that shown in (11), we define the multi-user game as: 
𝐺 = (𝑵, {𝑺𝑛}𝑛∈𝑵, {𝑂𝑛}𝑛∈𝑵), where 𝑺𝑛 = 𝝀𝑛⨂ 𝒑𝑛 ⊗ 𝒇𝑛 is the strategy space of mobile user n; 𝝀𝑛, 
𝒑𝑛 , and 𝒇𝑛  are the strategy spaces of offloading decision, transmission power, and CPU 
capability of user n, respectively, i.e., 𝜆𝑛 ∈ 𝝀𝑛, 𝑝𝑛 ∈ 𝒑𝑛, and 𝑓𝑛 ∈ 𝒇𝑛. For each strategy of user n, 
𝑠𝑛 ∈ 𝑺𝑛 and 𝑠𝑛 = {𝜆𝑛, 𝑝𝑛, 𝑓𝑛}. Moreover, 𝑺 =  {𝑺1, 𝑺2, … , 𝑺𝑁} is the strategy space set of all the 
mobile users. The utility function of mobile user n is 𝑂𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛) , in which 
𝑠−𝑛  =  (𝑠1, 𝑠2, … , 𝑠𝑛−1, 𝑠𝑛+1, … , 𝑠𝑁) is the strategies of all the others mobile users except user n. So 
the game 𝐺 can be stated as that for given 𝑠−𝑛, the mobile user n would like to choose a proper 
strategy 𝑠𝑛 = {𝜆𝑛, 𝑝𝑛, 𝑓𝑛} to minimize its computation overhead, i.e., 
 𝐺:    min𝑠𝑛∈𝑺𝑛 𝑂𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛) , ∀𝑛 ∈ 𝑵      (12) 
According to the conclusions in [19], [20], and [28], the approach which defines the individual 
computation overhead as the utility of each user is selfish and cannot guarantee obtain global 
optimization. So, the local altruistic behaviors among neighboring users, which is motivated by 
local cooperation in biographical systems [29][30], is introduced into the utility function 
construction. In game 𝐺, when the strategy of user n changes, the computation overheads of the 
users in 𝐼𝑛
𝑘,𝑜𝑢𝑡
 are affected; therefore, in the new overhead function, the computation overhead of 
the users in 𝐼𝑛
𝑘,𝑜𝑢𝑡
 are taken into account, which can be expressed as: 
 𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛) = 𝑂𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛) + ∑ 𝑂𝑖(𝑠𝑖,𝑠𝑛 , 𝑠−𝑖)𝑖∈𝐼𝑛
𝑘,𝑜𝑢𝑡     (13) 
where 𝑠𝑖,𝑠𝑛 means the strategy of user 𝑖 ∈ 𝐼𝑛
𝑘,𝑜𝑢𝑡
 when the strategy of user n is 𝑠𝑛. In (13), the 
first term in the right hand is the computation overhead of user n; the second term is the 
aggregated computation overhead of the users in 𝐼𝑛
𝑘,𝑜𝑢𝑡
. Then the new local altruistic game 𝐺′is: 
 𝐺′:     min𝑠𝑛∈𝑺𝑛𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛), ∀𝑛 ∈ 𝑵     (14) 
Based on the definition of game 𝐺′in (14), we define the NE of game 𝐺′as follows.  
Definition 2. A strategy profile 𝒔∗ = {𝑠1
∗, 𝑠2
∗, . . . , 𝑠𝑁
∗ } is a NE of game 𝐺′, if at the NE point s*, no 
mobile user can reduce their computation overhead by changing the strategy unilaterally. The 
mathematic formula expression is: for ∀𝑠𝑛 ∈ 𝑺𝑛 and ∀𝑛 ∈ 𝑵, 𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛
∗ , 𝑠−𝑛
∗ ) ≤ 𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛
∗ ) holds. 
At the NE point, each user cannot find a better strategy than the current one when the other users 
do not change their strategies. This property is important to the distributed issues, since each 
mobile user minimize their own overhead based on their own interest. Based on the game theory, 
once the mobile users make a decision to reduce the overhead, they must take the other mobile 
users’ strategies into account.  
A. The Existence and Uniqueness of the Nash Equilibrium 
Since the computation overhead 𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛) and the strategy space of transmission power 𝑝𝑛 are 
not continuous, so we introduce the concept of the potential game into the proof of the existence 
and uniqueness of the NE. For proving that 𝐺′ is a potential game, first, we define the potential 
game in Definition 3. 
Definition 3 [31][32]. A game is an exact potential game if there exists a potential function  
such that for ∀𝑛 ∈ 𝑵 and ∀𝑠𝑛, s𝑛
′ , 𝑠−𝑛 ∈ 𝑺𝑛, the following conditions hold: 
 𝑈𝑛(s𝑛
′ , 𝑠−𝑛) − 𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛) = Φ(s𝑛
′ , 𝑠−𝑛) − Φ(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛)      (15) 
Remark 1: For the exact potential game, if any mobile user changes its strategy (i.e., from 𝑠𝑛 to 
s𝑛
′ ), the variation in the overhead function equals to that in the potential function. The important 
property of the potential game is that there always exists a NE and the asynchronous better 
response update process must be finite and leads to a NE [31][32].  
Theorem 1. The game 𝐺′ shown in (14) is an exact potential game. 
Proof. Based on the conclusions in [19], [20], and [28], we define the potential function as: 
                Φ(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛) = ∑ 𝑂𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛)𝑛∈𝑵   
        = 𝑂𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛) + ∑ 𝑂𝑖(𝑠𝑖,𝑠𝑛 , 𝑠−𝑖)𝑖∈𝐼𝑛
𝑘,𝑜𝑢𝑡 + ∑ 𝑂𝑗(𝑠𝑗,𝑠𝑛 , 𝑠−𝑗)𝑗∈𝑁\𝐼𝑛
𝑘,𝑜𝑢𝑡\{𝑛}
    (16) 
The (16) can be divided into three parts. The first term in the right hand is the computation 
overhead of mobile user n; the second term represents the summary of the overheads of the users 
in 𝐼𝑛
𝑘,𝑜𝑢𝑡
; the third term is the computation overhead of the rest mobile users in the network. 
Since there are three variables in 𝑠𝑛, so there will be ∑ 𝐶3
𝑖3
𝑖=1 = 7 different changing models of 
𝑠𝑛. If we calculate the variation of the computation overhead function and the potential function 
based on all the changing models of 𝑠𝑛, the computation will be complex. However, the variables 
in 𝑠𝑛 can be divided into two different groups: 1) 𝜆𝑛 and 𝑝𝑛; these two variables can not only 
affect the overhead of user n but also the users in  𝐼𝑛
𝑘,𝑜𝑢𝑡
, denoted as 𝑝𝑎𝑟I; 2) 𝑓𝑛; when this 
variable changes, only the overhead of user n is affected, denoted as 𝑝𝑎𝑟II.  
When 𝑝𝑎𝑟I changes, i.e., 𝜆𝑛 or 𝑝𝑛 changes or both of these two variables change, no matter the  
𝑝𝑎𝑟II changes or not, the overheads of user n and the users in 𝐼𝑛
𝑘,𝑜𝑢𝑡
 change; the computation 
overheads of the rest users (i.e., the users in 𝑁\𝐼𝑛
𝑘,𝑜𝑢𝑡\{𝑛}) do not change, because the strategy 
changing of user n cannot affect the mobile users which are not in 𝐼𝑛
𝑘,𝑜𝑢𝑡
. The deviation of the 
computation overhead when the user n’s strategy changes from 𝑠𝑛 to s𝑛
′  can be calculated: 
               𝑈𝑛(s𝑛
′ , 𝑠−𝑛) − 𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛) = 𝑂𝑛(s𝑛
′ , 𝑠−𝑛) − 𝑂𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛) 
                                                                         + ∑ 𝑂𝑖(𝑠𝑖,𝑠𝑛′ , 𝑠−𝑖)𝑖∈𝐼𝑛
𝑘,𝑜𝑢𝑡 − ∑ 𝑂𝑖(𝑠𝑖,𝑠𝑛 , 𝑠−𝑖)𝑖∈𝐼𝑛
𝑘,𝑜𝑢𝑡      (17) 
According to (16), the variation of the potential function is:  
      Φ(s𝑛
′ , 𝑠−𝑛) − Φ(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛) = 𝑂𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛) − 𝑂𝑛(s𝑛
′ , 𝑠−𝑛) + ∑ 𝑂𝑖(𝑠𝑖,𝑠𝑛′ , 𝑠−𝑖)𝑖∈𝐼𝑛
𝑘,𝑜𝑢𝑡  
                  − ∑ 𝑂𝑖(𝑠𝑖,𝑠𝑛 , 𝑠−𝑖)𝑖∈𝐼𝑛
𝑘,𝑜𝑢𝑡  + ∑ 𝑂𝑗(𝑠𝑗,𝑠𝑛′ , 𝑠−𝑗)𝑗∈𝑁\𝐼𝑛
𝑘,𝑜𝑢𝑡\{𝑛}
− ∑ 𝑂𝑗(𝑠𝑗,𝑠𝑛 , 𝑠−𝑗)𝑗∈𝑁\𝐼𝑛
𝑘,𝑜𝑢𝑡\{𝑛}
  (18) 
Since in (19), ∑ 𝑂𝑗(𝑠𝑗,𝑠𝑛′ , 𝑠−𝑗)𝑗∈𝑁\𝐼𝑛
𝑘,𝑜𝑢𝑡\{𝑛}
− ∑ 𝑂𝑗(𝑠𝑗,𝑠𝑛 , 𝑠−𝑗)𝑗∈𝑁\𝐼𝑛
𝑘,𝑜𝑢𝑡\{𝑛}
= 0 , so 𝑈𝑛(s𝑛
′ , 𝑠−𝑛) −
𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛) = Φ(s𝑛
′ , 𝑠−𝑛) − Φ(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛)  holds.  
When the 𝑝𝑎𝑟II changes and the 𝑝𝑎𝑟I does not change, the computation overhead of the other 
mobile users except user n are keep constant. So based on (17),  ∑ 𝑂𝑖(𝑠𝑖,𝑠𝑛′ , 𝑠−𝑖)𝑖∈𝐼𝑛
𝑘,𝑜𝑢𝑡 −
∑ 𝑂𝑖(𝑠𝑖,𝑠𝑛 , 𝑠−𝑖)𝑖∈𝐼𝑛
𝑘,𝑜𝑢𝑡 = 0  and ∑ 𝑂𝑗(𝑠𝑗,𝑠𝑛′ , 𝑠−𝑗)𝑗∈𝑁\𝐼𝑛
𝑘,𝑜𝑢𝑡\{𝑛}
− ∑ 𝑂𝑗(𝑠𝑗,𝑠𝑛 , 𝑠−𝑗)𝑗∈𝑁\𝐼𝑛
𝑘,𝑜𝑢𝑡\{𝑛}
= 0 . Thus, 
the conclusion in (15) holds. Therefore, Theorem 1 is proved. 
Theorem 2. The NE of game 𝐺′ exists and is unique. 
Proof. This can be proved based on the properties of the potential game shown in [31] and [32]: 
if the game is an exact potential game, then it has unique pure NE strategy. Since the game 𝐺′ is 
an exact potential game, so the NE exists and is unique. Thus, the Theorem 2 holds. 
B. The best response strategy 
For the game which the existence and uniqueness are guaranteed, the best response dynamic 
always converges to a NE [33][34], so the best response dynamic is applied to reach the NE of 
game 𝐺′. In the best response strategy, each mobile user calculates the best response of the 
variables in s according to the information that gotten from BS, i.e., for given 𝑠−𝑛 , user n 
calculates the best response of 𝜆𝑛, 𝑝𝑛, and 𝑓𝑛 based on (13).  
Corollary 1. For ∀𝑝𝑛 ∈ 𝒑𝑛 and ∀𝑓𝑛 ∈ 𝒇𝑛, the best response of  𝜆𝑛 will be 𝜆𝑛 = 0 or 𝜆𝑛 = 1.  
Proof. Based on 𝑂𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛), the computation overhead function of game 𝐺
′ can be expressed as: 
𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛) = 𝛼𝑡,𝑛 (
𝜆𝑛𝐿𝑛
𝑟𝑛
𝑘(𝝀,𝒑)
+
𝜆𝑛𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛
𝑓𝑐
+
(1−𝜆𝑛)𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛
𝑓𝑛
) +𝛼𝑒,𝑛 (
𝜆𝑛𝑝𝑛
𝑘𝐿𝑛
𝑟𝑛
𝑘(𝝀,𝒑)
 + 𝜆𝑛𝜅𝑐𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛𝑓𝑐
2 + (1 − 𝜆𝑛)𝜅𝑛𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛𝑓𝑛
2)         
     + ∑ (𝛼𝑡,𝑖 (
𝜆𝑖𝐿𝑖
𝑟𝑖
𝑘(𝝀,𝒑)
+
𝜆𝑖𝐿𝑖𝐶𝑖
𝑓𝑐
+
(1−𝜆𝑖)𝐿𝑖𝐶𝑖
𝑓𝑖
)
𝑖∈𝐼𝑛
𝑘,𝑜𝑢𝑡 + 𝛼𝑒,𝑖 (
𝜆𝑖𝑝𝑖
𝑘𝐿𝑖
𝑟𝑖
𝑘(𝝀,𝒑)
 + 𝜆𝑖𝜅𝑐𝐿𝑖𝐶𝑖𝑓𝑐
2 + (1 − 𝜆𝑖)𝜅𝑖𝐿𝑖𝐶𝑖𝑓𝑖
2))   (19) 
Since when 𝜆𝑛 = 0 , 𝑝𝑛 = 0 , when 𝜆𝑛 ≠ 0 , 𝑝𝑛 ∈ [𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛, 𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑥] , so the 𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛)  is not 
continuous. For solving this issues, the value of 𝜆𝑛  is divided into two parts: 1) 𝜆𝑛 ∈ [𝜀, 1], 
where  is small enough and can near to 0 arbitrarily, then  𝑝𝑛 ∈ [𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛, 𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑥]; 2) 𝜆𝑛 = 0, then 
𝑝𝑛 = 0. When 𝜆𝑛 ∈ [𝜀, 1] and 𝑝𝑛 ≠ 0, the third term in (19) has no relation with 𝜆𝑛. Obviously, 
the 𝑂𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛) is a linear function on 𝜆𝑛; so the extreme value of 𝑂𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛) will be gotten 
when 𝜆𝑛 = 𝜀  or 𝜆𝑛 = 1 . When 𝛼𝑡,𝑛 (
𝐿𝑛
𝑟𝑛
𝑘(𝝀,𝒑)
+
𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛
𝑓𝑐
) + 𝛼𝑒,𝑛 (
𝑝𝑛
𝑘𝐿𝑛
𝑟𝑛
𝑘(𝝀,𝒑)
 + 𝜅𝑐𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛𝑓𝑐
2) > 𝛼𝑡,𝑛
𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛
𝑓𝑛
+
𝛼𝑒,𝑛𝜅𝑛𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛𝑓𝑛
2, the 𝑂𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛) is an increasing function and the minimum computation overhead 
can be gotten when 𝜆𝑛 = 𝜀. Thus, when 𝜀 → 0, the 𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛) can be calculated as: 
lim𝜀→0 𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛) = 𝛼𝑡,𝑛
𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛
𝑓𝑛
+ 𝛼𝑒,𝑛𝜅𝑛𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛𝑓𝑛
2 + ∑ (𝛼𝑡,𝑖 (
𝜆𝑖𝐿𝑖
𝑟𝑖,𝑝𝑛≠0
𝑘 (𝝀,𝒑)
+
𝜆𝑖𝐿𝑖𝐶𝑖
𝑓𝑐
+
(1−𝜆𝑖)𝐿𝑖𝐶𝑖
𝑓𝑖
)
𝑖∈𝐼𝑛
𝑘,𝑜𝑢𝑡   
                                                            + 𝛼𝑒,𝑖 (
𝜆𝑖𝑝𝑖
𝑘𝐿𝑖
𝑟𝑖,𝑝𝑛≠0
𝑘 (𝝀,𝒑)
 + 𝜆𝑖𝜅𝑐𝐿𝑖𝐶𝑖𝑓𝑐
2 + (1 − 𝜆𝑖)𝜅𝑖𝐿𝑖𝐶𝑖𝑓𝑖
2))    (20) 
When 𝛼𝑡,𝑛 (
𝐿𝑛
𝑟𝑛
𝑘(𝝀,𝒑)
+
𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛
𝑓𝑐
) + 𝛼𝑒,𝑛 (
𝑝𝑛
𝑘𝐿𝑛
𝑟𝑛
𝑘(𝝀,𝒑)
 + 𝜅𝑐𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛𝑓𝑐
2) < 𝛼𝑡,𝑛
𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛
𝑓𝑛
+ 𝛼𝑒,𝑛𝜅𝑛𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛𝑓𝑛
2, the 𝑂𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛) 
is a decreasing function; so the minimum overhead will be gotten when 𝜆𝑛 = 1, which is: 
 𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛)|𝜆𝑛=1 = 𝛼𝑡,𝑛 (
𝐿𝑛
𝑟𝑛
𝑘(𝝀,𝒑)
+
𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛
𝑓𝑐
) + 𝛼𝑒,𝑛 (
𝑝𝑛
𝑘𝐿𝑛
𝑟𝑛
𝑘(𝝀,𝒑)
 + 𝜅𝑐𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛𝑓𝑐
2) 
                                                    + ∑ (𝛼𝑡,𝑖 (
𝜆𝑖𝐿𝑖
𝑟𝑖,𝑝𝑛≠0
𝑘 (𝝀,𝒑)
+
𝜆𝑖𝐿𝑖𝐶𝑖
𝑓𝑐
+
(1−𝜆𝑖)𝐿𝑖𝐶𝑖
𝑓𝑖
)
𝑖∈𝐼𝑛
𝑘,𝑜𝑢𝑡   
                                                          + 𝛼𝑒,𝑖 (
𝜆𝑖𝑝𝑖
𝑘𝐿𝑖
𝑟𝑖,𝑝𝑛≠0
𝑘 (𝝀,𝒑)
 + 𝜆𝑖𝜅𝑐𝐿𝑖𝐶𝑖𝑓𝑐
2 + (1 − 𝜆𝑖)𝜅𝑖𝐿𝑖𝐶𝑖𝑓𝑖
2))  (21) 
When 𝜆𝑛 = 0, the computation overhead shown in (19) can be calculated as: 
𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛)|𝜆𝑛=0 = 𝛼𝑡,𝑛
𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛
𝑓𝑛
+ 𝛼𝑒,𝑛𝜅𝑛𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛𝑓𝑛
2 + ∑ (𝛼𝑡,𝑖 (
𝜆𝑖𝐿𝑖
𝑟𝑖,𝑝𝑛=0
𝑘 (𝝀,𝒑)
+
𝜆𝑖𝐿𝑖𝐶𝑖
𝑓𝑐
+
(1−𝜆𝑖)𝐿𝑖𝐶𝑖
𝑓𝑖
)
𝑖∈𝐼𝑛
𝑘,𝑜𝑢𝑡   
                                                        + 𝛼𝑒,𝑖 (
𝜆𝑖𝑝𝑖
𝑘𝐿𝑖
𝑟𝑖,𝑝𝑛=o
𝑘 (𝝀,𝒑)
 + 𝜆𝑖𝜅𝑐𝐿𝑖𝐶𝑖𝑓𝑐
2 + (1 − 𝜆𝑖)𝜅𝑖𝐿𝑖𝐶𝑖𝑓𝑖
2))     (22)  
According to (1), we have 𝑟𝑖,𝑝𝑛≠0
𝑘 (𝝀, 𝒑) = 𝑘 log2 (1 +
𝑝𝑖
𝑘𝐺𝑖
𝑁0+∑ 𝑝𝑗
𝑘
𝑗∈𝐼𝑖
𝑘 𝐺𝑗+𝑝𝑛
𝑘𝐺𝑛
)  and 𝑟𝑖,𝑝𝑛=0
𝑘 (𝝀, 𝒑) =
𝑘 log2 (1 +
𝑝𝑖
𝑘𝐺𝑖
𝑁0+∑ 𝑝𝑗
𝑘
𝑗∈𝐼𝑖
𝑘 𝐺𝑗
) , so 𝑟𝑖,𝑝𝑛≠0
𝑘 (𝝀, 𝒑) < 𝑟𝑖,𝑝𝑛=0
𝑘 (𝝀, 𝒑) ; therefore, based on (20) and (22), 
lim𝜀→0 𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛) > 𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛)|𝜆𝑛=0. So in this case, the best response of  𝜆𝑛 is 𝜆𝑛 = 0.  
When 𝛼𝑡,𝑛 (
𝐿𝑛
𝑟𝑛
𝑘(𝝀,𝒑)
+
𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛
𝑓𝑐
) + 𝛼𝑒,𝑛 (
𝑝𝑛
𝑘𝐿𝑛
𝑟𝑛
𝑘(𝝀,𝒑)
 + 𝜅𝑐𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛𝑓𝑐
2) < 𝛼𝑡,𝑛
𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛
𝑓𝑛
+ 𝛼𝑒,𝑛𝜅𝑛𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛𝑓𝑛
2 , the overhead 
function shown in (19) is a decreasing function. On one hand, the first two terms in (21) are 
smaller than that in (22); on the other hand, the third term in (21) is larger than that in (22) due to 
𝑟𝑖,𝑝𝑛≠0
𝑘 (𝝀, 𝒑) < 𝑟𝑖,𝑝𝑛=0
𝑘 (𝝀, 𝒑) . This means that 𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛)|𝜆𝑛=1  may larger or smaller than 
𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛)|𝜆𝑛=0. Therefore, in this case, the best response of 𝜆𝑛 is 𝜆𝑛 = 1 or 𝜆𝑛 = 0 according 
to the values of 𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛)|𝜆𝑛=1 and 𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛)|𝜆𝑛=0. Thus, the Corollary 1 holds. 
Remark 2: In the proof of Corollary 1, when 𝛼𝑡,𝑛 (
𝐿𝑛
𝑟𝑛
𝑘(𝝀,𝒑)
+
𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛
𝑓𝑐
) + 𝛼𝑒,𝑛 (
𝑝𝑛
𝑘𝐿𝑛
𝑟𝑛
𝑘(𝝀,𝒑)
 + 𝜅𝑐𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛𝑓𝑐
2) >
𝛼𝑡,𝑛
𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛
𝑓𝑛
+ 𝛼𝑒,𝑛𝜅𝑛𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛𝑓𝑛
2, the value of 𝜆𝑛 is 𝜆𝑛 = 0. This is easy to be understood since in this 
case, the task is calculated locally costs less resource than that in MEC server. However, when 
𝛼𝑡,𝑛 (
𝐿𝑛
𝑟𝑛
𝑘(𝝀,𝒑)
+
𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛
𝑓𝑐
) + 𝛼𝑒,𝑛 (
𝑝𝑛
𝑘𝐿𝑛
𝑟𝑛
𝑘(𝝀,𝒑)
 + 𝜅𝑐𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛𝑓𝑐
2) < 𝛼𝑡,𝑛
𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛
𝑓𝑛
+ 𝛼𝑒,𝑛𝜅𝑛𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛𝑓𝑛
2 , the best response of  
𝜆𝑛  is 𝜆𝑛 = 1  or 𝜆𝑛 = 0 ; this means that even the user n’s computation overhead of cloud 
computing is smaller than that of local computing, considering the overheads of the users in 
𝐼𝑛
𝑘,𝑜𝑢𝑡
, the user n may not offloads its task to MEC server.  
Corollary 2. The best response of the CPU capability 𝑓𝑛 is 𝑓𝑛 = (𝛼𝑡,𝑛 2𝛼𝑒,𝑛𝜅𝑛⁄ )
1/3
or 𝑓𝑛 = 0.  
Proof. When 𝜆𝑛 ≠ 0, 𝑓𝑛 = 0; only when 𝜆𝑛 = 0, 𝑓𝑛 ∈ (0, 𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑥]. Thus, when 𝜆𝑛 = 1, the best 
response of 𝑓𝑛 is 𝑓𝑛 = 0. When 𝜆𝑛 = 0, the computation overhead function is shown in (22). The 
first derivative of (22) on 𝑓𝑛  is: 𝑈𝑛
′ (𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛)|𝑓𝑛 = 2𝛼𝑒,𝑛𝜅𝑛𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛𝑓𝑛 − 𝛼𝑡,𝑛
𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛
𝑓𝑛
2  . When 
𝑈𝑛
′ (𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛)|𝑓𝑛 = 0 , 𝑓𝑛 = (𝛼𝑡,𝑛 2𝛼𝑒,𝑛𝜅𝑛⁄ )
1/3
; moreover, since 𝑈𝑛
′′(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛)|𝑓𝑛 = 2𝛼𝑒,𝑛𝜅𝑛𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛 +
2𝛼𝑡,𝑛
𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛
𝑓𝑛
3 > 0, so when 𝑓𝑛 = (𝛼𝑡,𝑛 2𝛼𝑒,𝑛𝜅𝑛⁄ )
1/3
, the 𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛) can get the minimum value. Thus 
the best response of the CPU capability 𝑓𝑛 is 𝑓𝑛 = (𝛼𝑡,𝑛 2𝛼𝑒,𝑛𝜅𝑛⁄ )
1/3
 or 𝑓𝑛 = 0. 
Corollary 3. For ∀𝜆𝑛 ∈ {0,1}, the best response of  𝑝𝑛  exists and 𝑝𝑛 = 0 or 𝑝𝑛 = ?̅?𝑛 , where 
?̅?𝑛 = arg   min𝑛∈𝑵{𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛|𝑝𝑛=𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛 , 𝑠−𝑛) , 𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛|𝑝𝑛=𝑝𝑛′ , 𝑠−𝑛), 𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛|𝑝𝑛=𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑥 , 𝑠−𝑛)}. 
Proof. Since the best response of offloading decision is 𝜆𝑛 ∈ {0,1} and when  𝜆𝑛 = 0, 𝑝𝑛 = 0, so 
the best response of 𝑝𝑛 when 𝜆𝑛 = 0 is 𝑝𝑛 = 0. When 𝜆𝑛 = 1, the task is offloaded to the MEC 
server. Since the delay and the energy consumption when the task is executed in MEC server 
have no relation with the transmission power, so we only consider the latency and the energy 
consumption caused by the data transmission. According to (19), the transmission overhead can 
be calculated as 𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛)𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠 = 𝛼𝑡,𝑛
𝐿𝑛
𝑟𝑛
𝑘(𝝀,𝒑)
+ 𝛼𝑒,𝑛
𝑝𝑛
𝑘𝐿𝑛
𝑟𝑛
𝑘(𝝀,𝒑)
+ ∑ 𝑈𝑖(𝑠𝑖, 𝑠−𝑖)𝑖∈𝐼𝑛
𝑘,𝑜𝑢𝑡 ; considering (1), 
the overhead of transmission can be written as: 
 𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛)𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠 = 𝑎𝑛
𝛼𝑡,𝑛+𝛼𝑒,𝑛𝑝𝑛
𝑘
ln(1+(𝑝𝑛
𝑘𝐺𝑛 Γ𝑛
𝑘⁄ ))
+ ∑
𝑏𝑖
ln(1+(𝑝𝑖
𝑘𝐺𝑖 𝑁0+𝑝𝑛
𝑘𝐺𝑛+∑ 𝑝𝑗
𝑘𝐺𝑗𝑗∈𝐼
𝑖
𝑘,𝑖𝑛
{𝑛}
⁄ ))
𝑖∈𝐼𝑛
𝑘,𝑜𝑢𝑡       (23) 
where 𝑎𝑛 = 𝐿𝑛 ln 2 𝑘⁄ , 𝑏𝑖 = 𝜆𝑖 𝐿𝑛(𝛼𝑡,𝑖 + 𝛼𝑒,𝑖𝑝𝑖
𝑘) ln 2 𝑘⁄ . The extreme value of (23) can be gotten 
when 𝑈𝑛
′ (𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛)𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠|𝑝𝑛𝑘 = 0. Since 𝑈𝑛
′ (𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛)𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠|𝑝𝑛𝑘 = 0 is a transcendental equation, so the 
analytical solution of 𝑈𝑛
′ (𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛)𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠|𝑝𝑛𝑘 = 0  does not exist. The numerical solution of 
𝑈𝑛
′ (𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛)𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠|𝑝𝑛𝑘 = 0  can be calculated by Newton Method. Let 𝑝𝑛
′  be the solution of 
𝑈𝑛
′ (𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛)𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠|𝑝𝑛𝑘 = 0; since the solution of 𝑈𝑛
′ (𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛)𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠|𝑝𝑛𝑘 = 0 may not single, so we define 
the 𝑝𝑛
′  as: 𝑝𝑛
′ = arg  {𝑈𝑛
′ (𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛)𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠|𝑝𝑛𝑘 = 0} . Therefore, if 𝑝𝑛
′ = ∅ , the 𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛)𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠  is a 
monotone function with 𝑝𝑛 ∈ [𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛, 𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑥], then the best response of  𝑝𝑛 will be 𝑝𝑛 = 𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛 or 
𝑝𝑛 = 𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑥 . If 𝑝𝑛
′ ≠ ∅ , the extreme value of (23) will be gotten at 𝑝𝑛
′ ; therefore, if 𝑝𝑛
′ ∈
[𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛, 𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑥], it means that the extreme value of (23) exists in the feasible region [𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛, 𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑥]; if 
𝑝𝑛
′ ∉ [𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛, 𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑥], the extreme value of (24) can be gotten when 𝑝𝑛
′ = 𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛 or 𝑝𝑛
′ = 𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑥. Thus, 
the best response of the transmission power 𝑝𝑛  can be calculated as 
?̅?𝑛 = arg   min𝑛∈𝑵{𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛|𝑝𝑛=𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛 , 𝑠−𝑛) , 𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛|𝑝𝑛=𝑝𝑛′ , 𝑠−𝑛), 𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛|𝑝𝑛=𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑥 , 𝑠−𝑛)}. Therefore, the best 
response of  𝑝𝑛 is 𝑝𝑛 = 0 or 𝑝𝑛 = ?̅?𝑛. 
Corollary 4. The best response of 𝜆𝑛 is decided by the interference from the mobile users in 
𝐼𝑛
𝑘,𝑜𝑢𝑡
, 𝐼𝑛
𝑘,𝑖𝑛
, and 𝐼𝑖
𝑘,𝑖𝑛
, where 𝐼𝑖
𝑘,𝑖𝑛
 is the set of the interference users which can affect the data 
transmission of user  𝑖 ∈ 𝐼𝑛
𝑘,𝑜𝑢𝑡
. 
Proof. Since the best response of 𝜆𝑛 is 𝜆𝑛 = 0 or 𝜆𝑛 = 1, so the best response of 𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛) can 
be expressed as: 
 𝑈𝑛
∗(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛) = {
𝑈1
∗ = 𝑈𝑛
∗(𝑠𝑛|𝑝𝑛=?̅?𝑛 , 𝑠−𝑛)𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠
+ 𝑈𝑛
∗(𝑠𝑛|𝑓𝑛=0, 𝑠−𝑛)𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑑
                   , 𝜆𝑛 = 1  
𝑈0
∗ = 𝑈𝑛
∗(𝑠𝑛|𝑝𝑛=0, 𝑠−𝑛)𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠
+ 𝑈𝑛
∗ (𝑠𝑛|𝑓𝑛=(𝛼𝑡,𝑛 2𝛼𝑒,𝑛𝜅𝑛⁄ )
1/3 , 𝑠−𝑛)
𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙
   , 𝜆𝑛 = 0 
  (24) 
where 𝑈𝑛
∗(𝑠𝑛|𝑝𝑛=?̅?𝑛 , 𝑠−𝑛)𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠
 and 𝑈𝑛
∗(𝑠𝑛|𝑝𝑛=0, 𝑠−𝑛)𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠
 are the best response of 𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛)𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠 , 
which can be gotten when 𝑝𝑛 = ?̅?𝑛  and 𝑝𝑛 = 0  in (23); 𝑈𝑛
∗(𝑠𝑛|𝑓𝑛=0, 𝑠−𝑛)𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑑
= 𝛼𝑡,𝑛 𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛 𝑓𝑐⁄ +
𝛼𝑒,𝑛𝜅𝑐𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛𝑓𝑐
2  is the best response of the computation overhead in MEC server; 
𝑈𝑛
∗ (𝑠𝑛|
𝑓𝑛=(
𝛼𝑡,𝑛
2𝛼𝑒,𝑛𝜅𝑛
)
1 3⁄ , 𝑠−𝑛)
𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙
 is the best response of the computation overhead in mobile user n.  
For the best response strategy, if 𝑈1
∗ < 𝑈0
∗, then 𝜆𝑛 = 1; otherwise, if 𝑈1
∗ > 𝑈0
∗, then 𝜆𝑛 = 0. From 
(24), we can conclude that the values of 𝑈1
∗ and 𝑈0
∗ relate to the best response of 𝜆𝑛, 𝑝𝑛, 𝑓𝑛, and 
the interference from the interference users (including the users in 𝐼𝑛
𝑘,𝑜𝑢𝑡
, 𝐼𝑛
𝑘,𝑖𝑛
, and 𝐼𝑖
𝑘,𝑖𝑛
); 
moreover, the value of (𝛼𝑡,𝑛 2𝛼𝑒,𝑛𝜅𝑛⁄ )
1/3
 is constant and the best response of  𝑝𝑛 is determined 
by the interference from the users in 𝐼𝑛
𝑘,𝑜𝑢𝑡 and 𝐼𝑛
𝑘,𝑖𝑛. So we can conclude that 𝑈1
∗ and 𝑈0
∗ will be 
decided by the interference from the interference users. This means that the best response of 𝜆𝑛 
is also decided by the interference from the interference users. Thus, the Corollary 4 holds. 
Remark 3: The Corollary 4 is easy to be understood since for the mobile user n, if the 
interference from the interference users is high, then calculating the task locally is beneficial; 
otherwise, offloading the task to the MEC server is the best choice. The Corollary 4 does not 
mean that 𝜆𝑛  and 𝑝𝑛  are independent, since both 𝜆𝑛  and 𝑝𝑛  are affected by the interference 
caused by the data transmission of the interference users. The Corollary 4 indicates that 
minimizing the interference is one possible approach to improve the performance of MEC.  
IV. DISTRIBUTED MULTI-USER POWER CONTROL AND OFFLOADING DECISION ALGORITHM 
For enabling the mobile users to achieve a mutually satisfactory decision making for power 
control, offloading decision, and CPU capability adjustment, the game theory is applied. Since 
we have proved the existence and the uniqueness of the NE, so the main idea of this algorithm is 
to let the mobile users improve their strategies in each time slot and reach the NE at the end. 
Thus, the slotted time structure and best response dynamic are used in this algorithm.  
A. Algorithm Design 
In each time slot, before calculating the best responses of 𝜆𝑛, 𝑝𝑛, and 𝑓𝑛, the BS collects the 
necessary information
1
 from the interference users by the cooperation between different BSs 
[5][18][19][20]. Considering the fact that the interference users can affect the data transmission 
of user n only when they offload the computation tasks to the MEC servers, so it is beneficial if 
the information collection and exchanging are done by the BSs (i.e., the base stations that these 
interference users belong to); moreover, the resource in BS is also much richer than that in 
mobile user. At the beginning of each time slot, the BS l that user n belongs to collects the 
information of the interference users from the neighbor BSs. When the necessary information has 
gotten by the BS, it will send the information to user n. Then user n calculates the best responses 
of 𝜆𝑛, 𝑝𝑛, and 𝑓𝑛, and updates its strategy based on these best responses. First, user n calculates 
the values of  ?̅?𝑛 and (𝛼𝑡,𝑛 2𝛼𝑒,𝑛𝜅𝑛⁄ )
1/3
 according to Corollary 2 and Corollary 3; when these two 
                                                 
1
 The necessary information of the interference users include all the necessary parameters to calculate 𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛 , 𝑠−𝑛) 
shown in (19), which includes the offloading decision, the transmission power, the size of the task data of the 
interference users. 
values are gotten, the best response of 𝑈1
∗ and 𝑈0
∗ can be calculated. The offloading decision 𝜆𝑛 is 
decided based on the rules as follows: If 𝑈1
∗ < 𝑈0
∗, then 𝜆𝑛 = 1; otherwise, if 𝑈1
∗ > 𝑈0
∗, 𝜆𝑛 = 0. 
Once the offloading decision is determined, the best response of the transmission power 𝑝𝑛 and 
the CPU capability 𝑓𝑛 can be decided based on: If 𝜆𝑛 = 0, then 𝑝𝑛 = 0 and 𝑓𝑛 = (𝛼𝑡,𝑛 2𝛼𝑒,𝑛𝜅𝑛⁄ )
1/3
; 
otherwise, if 𝜆𝑛 = 1, then 𝑝𝑛 = ?̅?𝑛 and 𝑓𝑛 = 0. This process will be executed repeatedly until the 
NE is reached.  
Algorithm 1: Joint offloading decision and resource allocation  
1. initialization: 
2. each mobile user n chooses the offloading decision, the transmission power, and CPU capability 
as: 𝜆𝑛 = 1, 𝑝𝑛 = 𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑥, and 𝑓𝑛 = 0; 
3. end 
4. repeat for each user and each decision slot in parallel: 
5. send the pilot signal on the chosen communication channel to the base station; 
6. receive the necessary information of the interference users of other small cells; 
7. calculate the best response of the transmission power ?̅?𝑛  and the CPU capability 
(𝛼𝑡,𝑛 2𝛼𝑒,𝑛𝜅𝑛⁄ )
1/3
; 
8. calculate the 𝑈1
∗ and 𝑈0
∗ based on ?̅?𝑛 and (𝛼𝑡,𝑛 2𝛼𝑒,𝑛𝜅𝑛⁄ )
1/3
; 
9. if  𝑈1
∗ > 𝑈0
∗ 
10.       𝜆𝑛 = 0; 
11. else if  𝑈1
∗ < 𝑈0
∗ 
12.      𝜆𝑛 = 1; 
13. end if 
14. if 𝜆𝑛 = 0 
15.      𝑝𝑛 = 0 and 𝑓𝑛 = (𝛼𝑡,𝑛 2𝛼𝑒,𝑛𝜅𝑛⁄ )
1/3
; 
16. else if 𝜆𝑛 = 1 
17.      𝑝𝑛 = ?̅?𝑛 and 𝑓𝑛 = 0; 
18. end if 
19. repeat until NE is meet. 
 
B. Convergence Analysis and Computation Complexity 
In [31] and [32], the authors have proved that for any potential game, the best response dynamics 
always converge to a pure Nash Equilibrium. Since the game 𝐺′ is an exact potential game, so 
the algorithm proposed in this paper is convergent. 
Corollary 5. Finding the NE of game 𝐺′ by the best response approach is PLS complete. 
Proof. In [31] and [32], the authors have proved that for the potential game which applies the 
best response approach in the process of reaching NE, if the best response can be computed in 
polynomial time, then this problem is PLS (Polynomial Local Search) complete. In game 𝐺′, 
there are three best responses need to be calculated in each time slot, which are 𝜆𝑛, 𝑝𝑛, and 𝑓𝑛. 
The computation complexity for calculating the best response of 𝑓𝑛  is 𝑂(1) , since the best 
response of 𝑓𝑛 is constant. For calculating the best response of 𝑝𝑛, the Newton Method is applied. 
In [35], the authors have proved that for 𝑓(𝑥), the computation complexity of the Newton 
Method is 𝑂[log(𝑛)𝐹(𝑛)], where 𝐹(𝑛) is the computation cost of 𝑓(𝑥) 𝑓′(𝑥)⁄ . Moreover, in game 
𝐺′ , 𝑓(𝑥) = 𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛) . Since 𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛)  and 𝑈𝑛
′ (𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛)  are all polynomial, so the 
𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛) 𝑈𝑛
′ (𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛)⁄  is also polynomial. This means that the computation of 𝐹(𝑛)  can be 
completed in polynomial time. Thus, the calculation of the best response of  𝑝𝑛 can be finished in 
polynomial time. Based on Corollary 4, the best response of 𝜆𝑛 relates to the calculation of  ?̅?𝑛 
and (𝛼𝑡,𝑛 2𝛼𝑒,𝑛𝜅𝑛⁄ )
1/3
; therefore, the computation of 𝜆𝑛  also can be completed in polynomial 
time. Thus, the Corollary 5 holds.  
Remark 4: For game 𝐺′ , in each time slot, the computation complexity relates to the best 
response calculation of 𝜆𝑛 , 𝑝𝑛 , and 𝑓𝑛 . As shown in Corollary 5, the complexity of the best 
response computation of 𝑓𝑛 is 𝑂(1), which is much simpler than that of 𝑝𝑛 and 𝜆𝑛 and can be 
ignored. Moreover, when the best response of  𝑝𝑛 and 𝑓𝑛 are gotten, the complexity of the best 
response calculation of 𝜆𝑛  is also simple, which is shown in (24). Therefore, the main 
computation complexity of this algorithm is caused by the calculation of the best response of 𝑝𝑛, 
i.e., the Newton Method. So the computation complexity of game 𝐺′ is 𝑂[log(𝑛)𝐹(𝑛)] in one 
time slot, where 𝐹(𝑛) is the computation cost of 𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛) 𝑈𝑛
′ (𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛)⁄ . According to (19), the 
computation cost of 𝐹(𝑛)  is 𝑂[𝑛 log2(𝑛)] . Therefore, the computation complexity of this 
algorithm in one time slot is 𝑂[𝑛 log3(𝑛)]. Assuming that the algorithm needs C rounds iteration 
for reaching NE, then the computation complexity of the proposed algorithm is [5]: 
𝑂[𝐶𝑛 log3(𝑛)]. This demonstrates that the algorithm can be completed in polynomial time. 
C. Theoretical Analysis of the proposed algorithm 
In this section, we learn the price of anarchy (PoA) of the computation overhead of the whole 
network, i.e., ∑ 𝑈𝑛𝑛∈𝑵,𝑠𝑛∈𝒔 . Based on the conclusion in [36], the PoA is defined as: 
 𝑃𝑜𝐴 =
∑ 𝑈𝑛𝑛∈𝑵,𝑠𝑛∈𝒔 (?̃?)
∑ ?̅?𝑛𝑛∈𝑵,𝑠𝑛∈𝒔 (𝒑
∗)
    (25)  
where ?̃? is the NE of game 𝐺′, 𝒔∗ is the centralized optimal solution for all the mobile users, 
𝑈𝑛 is the overhead of user n by the game theory based algorithm; ?̅?𝑛 is the overhead by the 
centralized algorithm. For the MEC, the smaller PoA, the better performance of is [5].  
Corollary 6. For game 𝐺′, the PoA of the network computation overhead satisfies that: 
 1 ≤ 𝑃𝑜𝐴 ≤
∑ (𝑈𝑛,𝑐
𝑚𝑎𝑥+∑ 𝑈𝑖𝑖∈𝐼𝑛
𝑘,𝑜𝑢𝑡 )+∑ (𝑈𝑛
𝑚𝑎𝑥+∑ 𝑈𝑖𝑖∈𝐼𝑛
𝑘,𝑜𝑢𝑡 )
𝑁
𝑛=1,𝜆𝑛=0
𝑁
𝑛=1,𝜆𝑛=1
∑ (?̅?𝑛,𝑐
𝑚𝑖𝑛+∑ 𝑈𝑖𝑖∈𝐼𝑛
𝑘,𝑜𝑢𝑡 )+∑ (?̅?𝑛
𝑚𝑖𝑛+∑ 𝑈𝑖𝑖∈𝐼𝑛
𝑘,𝑜𝑢𝑡 )
𝑁
𝑛=1,𝜆𝑛=0
𝑁
𝑛=1,𝜆𝑛=1
    (26) 
where 𝑈𝑛,𝑐
𝑚𝑎𝑥 =
(𝛼𝑡+𝛼𝑒𝑝𝑛)𝑠𝑛
𝑤𝑘 log2(1+
𝑝𝑛𝐺𝑛
𝑁0+∑ 𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑥
′ 𝐺𝑗𝑗∈𝐼𝑛
𝑘,𝑖𝑛
,𝜆𝑗=1
)
+ 𝛼𝑡𝑡𝑛,𝑐 + 𝛼𝑒𝑒𝑛,𝑐 , 𝑈𝑛
𝑚𝑎𝑥 =
𝛼𝑡𝑐𝑛
𝑓𝑛
𝑚𝑎𝑥 + 𝛼𝑒𝜅𝑛𝑐𝑛(𝑓𝑛
𝑚𝑎𝑥)2 , 
?̅?𝑛,𝑐
𝑚𝑎𝑥 =
(𝛼𝑡+𝛼𝑒𝑝𝑛)𝑠𝑛
𝑤𝑘 log2(1+
𝑝𝑛𝐺𝑛
𝑁0
)
+ 𝛼𝑡𝑡𝑛,𝑐 + 𝛼𝑒𝑒𝑛,𝑐 , ?̅?𝑛
𝑚𝑎𝑥 =
𝛼𝑡𝑐𝑛
𝑓𝑛
∗ + 𝛼𝑒𝜅𝑛𝑐𝑛(𝑓𝑛
∗)2 , and 𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑥
′ ≜ max {𝑝𝑗, 𝑗 ∈
𝐼𝑛
𝑘,𝑖𝑛 }. The 𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑥
′  is the maximum transmission power of all the mobile users in 𝐼𝑛
𝑘,𝑖𝑛
. 
Proof. Assuming that ?̃? is the NE of game 𝐺′ and 𝒔∗ is the centralized optimal solution for all the 
mobile users. According to the conclusion in [5] and [31], since the performance of the 
centralized optimal algorithm is better than that of game theory based algorithm, so 𝑃𝑜𝐴 ≥ 1. 
For the game theory based algorithm, when 𝜆𝑛 = 1, the transmission rate of user n satisfies that: 
 𝑟𝑛(?̃?) = 𝑤𝑘 log2 (1 +
𝑝𝑛𝐺𝑛
𝑁0+∑ 𝑝𝑗𝐺𝑗𝑗∈𝐼𝑛
𝑘,𝑖𝑛
,𝜆𝑗=1
) ≥ 𝑤𝑘 log2 (1 +
𝑝𝑛𝐺𝑛
𝑁0+∑ 𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑥
′ 𝐺𝑗𝑗∈𝐼𝑛
𝑘,𝑖𝑛
,𝜆𝑗=1
)   (27) 
where 𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑥
′ ≜ max {𝑝𝑗, 𝑗 ∈ 𝐼𝑛
𝑘,𝑖𝑛 }. Based on (9) and (27), the overhead of user n satisfies that: 
𝑈𝑛,𝑐 =
(𝛼𝑡+𝛼𝑒𝑝𝑛)𝑠𝑛
𝑤𝑘 log2(1+
𝑝𝑛𝐺𝑛
𝑁0+∑ 𝑝𝑗𝐺𝑗𝑗∈𝐼𝑛
𝑘,𝑖𝑛
,𝜆𝑗=1
)
+ 𝛼𝑡𝑡𝑛,𝑐 + 𝛼𝑒𝑒𝑛,𝑐 ≤
(𝛼𝑡+𝛼𝑒𝑝𝑛)𝑠𝑛
𝑤𝑘 log2(1+
𝑝𝑛𝐺𝑛
𝑁0+∑ 𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑥
′ 𝐺𝑗𝑗∈𝐼𝑛
𝑘,𝑖𝑛
,𝜆𝑗=1
)
   
+ 𝛼𝑡𝑡𝑛,𝑐 +  𝛼𝑒𝑒𝑛,𝑐 = 𝑈𝑛,𝑐
𝑚𝑎𝑥  (28) 
When 𝜆𝑛 = 0, the overhead of user n can be calculated as: 
 𝑈𝑛 =
𝛼𝑡𝑐𝑛
𝑓𝑛
𝑚𝑎𝑥 + 𝛼𝑒𝜅𝑛𝑐𝑛(𝑓𝑛
𝑚𝑎𝑥)2 ≤
𝛼𝑡𝑐𝑛
𝑓𝑛
𝑚𝑎𝑥 + 𝛼𝑒𝜅𝑛𝑐𝑛(𝑓𝑛
𝑚𝑎𝑥)2 = 𝑈𝑛
𝑚𝑎𝑥   (29) 
For the centralized optimal algorithm, when 𝜆𝑛 = 1, the transmission rate satisfied that: 
 𝑟𝑛(𝒔
∗) = 𝑤𝑘 log2 (1 +
𝑝𝑛𝐺𝑛
𝑁0+∑ 𝑝𝑗𝐺𝑗𝑗∈𝐼𝑛
𝑘,𝑖𝑛
,𝜆𝑗=1
) ≤ 𝑤𝑘 log2 (1 +
𝑝𝑛𝐺𝑛
𝑁0
)   (30) 
Therefore, when 𝜆𝑛 = 1, we have: 
𝑈𝑛,𝑐 =
(𝛼𝑡+𝛼𝑒𝑝𝑛)𝑠𝑛
𝑤𝑘 log2(1+
𝑝𝑛𝐺𝑛
𝑁0+∑ 𝑝𝑗𝐺𝑗𝑗∈𝑁\{𝑛},𝜆𝑗=1
)
+ 𝛼𝑡𝑡𝑛,𝑐 + 𝛼𝑒𝑒𝑛,𝑐 ≥
(𝛼𝑡+𝛼𝑒𝑝𝑛)𝑠𝑛
𝑤𝑘 log2(1+
𝑝𝑛𝐺𝑛
𝑁0
)
+ 𝛼𝑡𝑡𝑛,𝑐 + 𝛼𝑒𝑒𝑛,𝑐 = ?̅?𝑛,𝑐
𝑚𝑖𝑛  (31) 
Similar to the game theory based algorithm, when 𝜆𝑛 = 0, the computation overhead is:  
 𝑈𝑛 =
𝛼𝑡𝑐𝑛
𝑓𝑛
+ 𝛼𝑒𝜅𝑛𝑐𝑛𝑓𝑛
2 ≥
𝛼𝑡𝑐𝑛
𝑓𝑛
𝑚𝑖𝑛 + 𝛼𝑒𝜅𝑛𝑐𝑛(𝑓𝑛
𝑚𝑖𝑛)
2
= ?̅?𝑛
𝑚𝑖𝑛   (32) 
Thus, according to (28), (29), (31), and (32), the Corollary 6 holds. 
Note that the PoA reflects the worst cause of the game theory based algorithm on the centralized 
optimal algorithm; therefore, based on Corollary 6, we can conclude that with the reducing of the 
interference from the interference users, the PoA decreases. This demonstrates that controlling 
the network interference is effective on improving the performance of the MEC system, which is 
consistent with the conclusion in Corollary 4. 
Corollary 7. The NE of game 𝐺′ is a global optimal solution for the optimal issue shown in (11). 
Proof. Assuming that 𝒔 = {𝑠1, 𝑠2, … , 𝑠𝑁} is a NE of game 𝐺
′and 𝒔′ = {𝑠1
′ , 𝑠2
′ , … , 𝑠𝑁
′ } is a global 
optimal solution of (11). Since 𝒔′ = {𝑠1
′ , 𝑠2
′ , … , 𝑠𝑁
′ } is a global optimal solution, so we have 
∑ 𝑂𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛)𝑛∈𝑵 ≥ ∑ 𝑂𝑛( 𝑠𝑛
′ , 𝑠−𝑛
′ )𝑛∈𝑵 . Moreover, 𝐺
′  is an exact potential game with potential 
function is Φ(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛) = ∑ 𝑂𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛)𝑛∈𝑵 , so Φ(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛) ≤ Φ(𝑠𝑛
′ , 𝑠−𝑛
′ ) holds when 𝒔 is a NE 
and 𝒔′ is not, i.e., ∑ 𝑂𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛)𝑛∈𝑵 ≤ ∑ 𝑂𝑛(𝑠𝑛
′ , 𝑠−𝑛
′ )𝑛∈𝑵 . This conclusion is contradictory with the 
assumption, so the Corollary 7 holds. 
Corollary 8. The NE of game 𝐺′ is Pareto Efficiency. 
Proof. Based on [37], the Pareto efficiency is defined as: if 𝒙 = {𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑁}, where 𝑥𝑖 ∈ ℝ 
and 𝑖 ∈ 𝑵, is Pareto optimal solution and 𝑈𝑖 is the utility of i, then there is no other feasible 
solution 𝒙′ = {𝑥1
′ , 𝑥2
′ , … , 𝑥𝑁
′ } such that 𝑈𝑖(𝑥𝑖
′) ≥ 𝑈𝑖(𝑥𝑖) for all the users with 𝑈𝑖(𝑥𝑖
′) > 𝑈𝑖(𝑥𝑖) for 
some users. In game 𝐺′, assuming that 𝒔 = {𝑠1, 𝑠2, … , 𝑠𝑁} is a NE; so for ∀𝑛 ∈ 𝑵, there is no 
solution 𝒔′ = {𝑠1
′ , 𝑠2
′ , … , 𝑠𝑁
′ } which can make the 𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛) ≥ 𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛
′ , 𝑠−𝑛) hold; moreover, the 
solution 𝒔′ = {𝑠1
′ , 𝑠2
′ , … , 𝑠𝑁
′ } also cannot make the 𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛) > 𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛
′ , 𝑠−𝑛) holds for all the 
users. According to Corollary 7, the NE of game 𝐺′ is also a global optimal solution of (11). So, 
on one hand, the NE of game 𝐺′ is the optimal solution of the global function shown in (11), 
which means that 𝑈𝑖(𝑥𝑖
′) > 𝑈𝑖(𝑥𝑖) for some users holds; on the other hand, no users can reduce 
their computation overhead without increasing other users overhead, which means that 𝑈𝑖(𝑥𝑖
′) ≥
𝑈𝑖(𝑥𝑖) for all the users holds. Thus, the NE of game 𝐺
′ is Pareto efficiency. 
V. NUMERICAL RESULT 
In this simulation, there are 5 BSs and the coverage range of each BS is 50m [5][38]; the mobile 
users are deployed in the coverage area of BS with the numbers vary from 20 to 50. The band-
width of the wireless channel is 5MHz. The transmission power of user changes from 𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛 to 
𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑥; the 𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛 can be calculated according to the SINR threshold and the measured interference 
in Section IV; the 𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑥 is set to 150mW. The noise is -100dBm [26]. The channel gain 𝐺𝑛 = 𝑑𝑛,𝑙
−𝛾
 
[26], where 𝑑𝑛,𝑙 is the distance between the mobile user n and BS l; 𝛾 is the path loss factor 
which is set to 4. Similar to [5], in this simulation, 𝐿𝑛 = 5000Kb and 𝐶𝑛 = 1000Megacycles. The 
CPU computation capability 𝑓𝑐 is 10GHz. The decision weights 𝛼𝑡, 𝛼𝑒 ∈ [0,1] and 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛼𝑒 = 1, 
so we set 𝛼𝑡 ∈ {1,0.5,0} [5]. For each mobile user, 𝜅𝑛 = 10
−27 and 𝑓𝑛,𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 1GHz [13].  
  
Fig.2. Convergence of offloading decision Fig.3. Convergence of the CPU capability 
  
Fig.4. Convergence of the transmission power Fig.5. Convergence of the user’s computation overhead 
               
Fig.2 to Fig.5 illustrates the convergence of the algorithm proposed in this paper. Fig.2 shows the 
convergence of the offloading decisions. The same as that proved in Corollary 1, the value of λ 
converges to 0 or 1 with the increasing of the iteration times. As shown in Fig.3, the value of 
CPU capability is also binary, i.e. 𝑓 = 0  or 𝑓 = 𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑥 . Moreover, the values of the CPU 
capability and the offloading decision are contrary, which can be found in Fig.2 and Fig.3. This 
is consistent with the theoretical analysis in Section III. The transmission power of mobile user is 
shown in Fig.4, which is convergence and smaller than 𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑥. Different with the CPU capability, 
when the offloading decision is 1, the transmission power is larger than 0; otherwise, the 
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transmission power equals to 0. Fig.5 demonstrates that the computation overhead of each 
mobile user is convergent, too. 
Fig.6 demonstrates the variation of the PoA with the increasing of the interference. In this 
simulation, we use 1/𝑆𝐼𝑁𝑅  to represent the effection of the interference, where 𝑆𝐼𝑁𝑅 =
∑ 𝑆𝐼𝑁𝑅𝑛𝑛∈𝑵  and 𝑆𝐼𝑁𝑅𝑛 is the SINR of user n. So the larger 1/𝑆𝐼𝑁𝑅, the larger interference is. 
With the increasing of the interference, the PoA increases. This can be concluded based on 
Corollary 6. When the value of 1/𝑆𝐼𝑁𝑅  is fixed, such as 0.7, the PoA decreases with the 
increasing of the network density. This is because when the value of 1/𝑆𝐼𝑁𝑅 is fixed, the more 
users in the network, the smaller interference of each user; so the PoA is small when the network 
density is large. Fig.7 illustrates the number of users which offload their computation tasks to the 
MEC server under different network densities and computation loads. Since the algorithm is 
convergence, so the number of users which offload task to MEC server becomes constant when 
the iteration times is large enough (the more users in the network, the more iteration times 
needed). Before reaching the NE point, with the increasing of the iteration time, the resource in 
mobile users is consumed and more and more mobile user chooses to offload the computation 
task to the MEC server. This is because the MEC server has much better computation capability 
and resource than the mobile users. The number of users which offload tasks to the MEC server 
increases when the network density increases. However, this increasing becomes slowly when 
the network density is large; because, the inter-cell interference is serious when the network 
density is large, so the ratio of users which offload their tasks to MEC server decreases. 
Moreover, if the length of input data increases, the number of users which offload the tasks to 
MEC server under the same network density increases, too. This is because when the length of 
the data increases, the computation overhead of the local execution increases, which can be 
found in (24); therefore, more users will offload their computation task to the MEC server for 
saving energy and reducing latency. 
  
Fig.6. The PoA under different network conditions Fig.7. The number of beneficial users under different 
network conditions 
  
Fig.8. The network overhead under different network 
conditions 
Fig.9. The convergence rate under different network 
density 
 
In Fig.8, the network overheads under different network densities, different computation loads, 
and different iteration times are presented. Different with the results shown in Fig.7, in Fig.8, 
with the increasing of the iteration time, the network overhead decreases before reaching the NE 
point; when the network reaches NE, the network overhead keeps constant. This result 
demonstrates that the proposed algorithm is effective on reducing network computation overhead. 
For different network densities, the more users in the network, the higher computation overhead 
is. This is because the more users, the more serious inter-cell interference is, which leads to high 
network computation overhead. However, due to the game between different users, the 
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increasing of the computation overhead with the increasing of the network density become 
slowly. This means that the algorithm proposed in this paper is effective on improving the 
performance of MEC system. The Fig.8 also demonstrates that when the computation load 
increases, the network overhead increases, too. The reason is similar to that shown in Fig.7. The 
number of iteration times for reaching NE under different network densities is shown in Fig.9. 
Due to the inter-cell interference, the more users, the more iteration times are needed. The 
increasing is near a linear, which means that the algorithm can converge in a fast manner. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we proposed a game theory based jointing offloading decision and resource 
allocation algorithm for multi-user MEC. We prove that this game is an exact potential game and 
the NE of this game exists and is unique. The convergence and the computation complexity of 
this algorithm are investigated. Moreover: 1) we investigate the PoA of this algorithm and 
conclude that the interference from the interference users has main effection on the performance 
of MEC, which is consistent with the conclusion in Corollary 4; 2) we prove that the NE of this 
game is Pareto efficiency and also the global optimal solution shown in (11). The simulation 
results shou the effectiveness of this algorithm on improving the performance of MEC.  
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